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The Division's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari embraces the same error engaged in by the 
Court of Appeals -- not in its amended opinion of February 19, 
1992, but in the Court of Appeals' original opinion of November 
29, 1991. Specifically, and as if it hadn't read the amended 
opinion, the Division continues to argue that its Summary Order 
of March 1, 1989, was a "Stop Trading Order." See e.g., Division 
brief at pp. 3-4. The Court of Appeals scuttled this untenable 
proposition in its amended opinion. The Division simply doesn't 
understand what the amended opinion says and what the Division 
itself, as a state regulatory agency, has the power to do. 
While the Division continues to embrace the admittedly 
erroneous original opinion of the Court of Appeals, the Court of 
Appeals' amended opinion acknowledges that a summary order 
entered under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3) does not operate to 
"suspend trading."1 Further, while the amended opinion does 
indeed recognize that trading cannot be suspended under Utah law, 
1
 This singular aspect of the amended opinion (something it holds by default by 
deleting its prior §12 analysis) is correct because "trading" is an exclusively federal concept 
as set forth in the avowed purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an Act over 
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The Preamble of such Act states: 
An Act to provide for the regulation of 
securities exchanges and of over-the-counter 
markets operating in interstate and foreign 
commerce and through the mails, to prevent 
inequitable and unfair practices on such 
exchanges and markets, and for other 
purposes. 
See p. 33, Petitioners' Court of Appeals Brief below; see also Section 2 of the Exchange Act, 
Necessity for Regulation as Provided in This Title, Vol 2, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1120,111 at 
p. 15,051, Rel. #1267 (January 6, 1988). 
the Court of Appeals still errs by further holding (in an effort 
to achieve the same, original result) that the "intent, scope or 
purpose" of the Summary Order is to "suspend trading," The 
amended opinion is thus even more erroneous than the first 
opinion because it allows the Division to accomplish indirectly 
what it admittedly could never do directly. The Division's brief 
in opposition only underscores the whole problem: the Division 
has tried to convince the Court of Appeals, from the ALJ on up, 
that a §14(3) summary order is a "trading suspension" when it 
cannot be as a matter of law. Thus, even if the Johnsons1 
post-market-making purchases were tantamount to "trading" (which 
they aren't as a matter of law), it doesn't matter. 
The Division next argues that because Judge Greene 
concluded that Johnson-Bowles "knew or should have known about 
the irregularities" respecting U.S.A. Medical stock, its conduct 
in honoring its outstanding federal contracts — after it was no 
longer a market-maker — is necessarily "dishonest or 
unethical." Three things this Court must recognize: First, 
under Rule 15c2-ll(f)(3)(i) and (ii) of the General Rules and 
Regulations of the Commission, a full copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A", a broker may commence market-making 
activities in a security with no due dilligence based on other 
brokers already being "in the sheets" on (i.e., trading) the same 
stock. In other words, Johnson-Bowles had every right to trade 
U.S.A. Medical in late 1988/early 1989 without confirming — on 
its own, independently — the truth and accuracy of 
U.S.A. Medical's due dilligence materials.2 See Exhibit 
"A". Thus, for what it's worth, based on Rule 15c2-ll(f)(3)(i) 
and (ii)/ Judge Greene was wrong and he didn't need to make such 
finding to deny Johnson-Bowles' motion for preliminary injunction 
even though he may have thought it was necessary to do so. At 
the same time, the exemptions provided in Rule 15c2-ll(f) were 
never pointed out to Judge Greene because Johnson-Bowles was not, 
or at least didn't think, that it was on trial on February 27 and 
28, 1989. 
Secondly, it would be sheer madness for a broker to 
trade a security knowing the stock is "boxed" by a band of 
hoodlums. Johnson-Bowles obviously had no idea this was the case 
or it never would have allowed its traders to become "short" in 
the first place.3 
Third, no one would expect a stock which was forward-
split to increase ten-fold. On the contrary, the stock should 
have traded at 100 per share after the forward-split, not the 
2
 In order to make-a-market in U.S.A. Medical, Johnson-Bowles was entitled to 
rely on the exemptions provided in Rule 15c2-11(f)(3) because it was not the first broker to 
be "in the sheets" in late 1988/early 1989 and several other broker-dealers had continuously 
been "in the sheets." Furthermore, assuming such had not been the case, Johnson-Bowles 
complied with Rule 15c2-11(a)(5), also comprising Exhibit "A", because the "source" of U.S.A. 
Medical's due dilligence materials, namely, James L. Averett, a local securities attorney who 
prepared and endorsed such materials, is a person that Johnson-Bowles had "a reasonable 
basis for believing was reliable." See Subsection (a)(5) to Rule 15c2-11. See also p. 9, 
footnote 6, the Johnsons' Court of Appeals Brief below, citing to U.S.A. Medical's due 
dilligence package in the record, an exhibit to Johnson-Bowies' federal court 10b-5 
complaint. Specifically, it is Exhibit "H" to the Johnsons' Hearing Exhibit R-5. 
3
 This is not to ignore that Johnson-Bowles originally became "short" 15,000 
shares, an amount which automatically converted on January 23, 1989 into 150,000 shares, 
as a result of a fail-to-deliver by Rick Hermanson, one of the U.S.A. Medical co-
conspirators. 
equivalent of $10 per share. Again, that this occurred was not 
the fault of either Johnson-Bowles or Mr. Johnson and the 
opposite effect of a normal forward-split was far beyond their 
control. 
In sum, having made a market in U.S.A. Medical in late 
1988/early 1989 — even in light of Judge Greene's determination 
— does not make Johnson-Bowles in pari delicto with the 
criminals who manipulated its stock. See e.g., Jessup, 
Josephthal & Co v. Piquet & Cie, [1991 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,195 at p. 91,029 (S.D.N.Y., August 
21, 1991) (negligence, imprudence, stupidity, or even 
recklessness are legally insufficient to trigger in pari delicto 
or aiding and abetting liability), a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". See also pp. 59, 71, 72, 75 and 81, the 
Johnsons1 Court of Appeals Brief below, citing the U.S. Supreme 
Court's 1988 Pinter v. Dahl4 decision and this Court's decision 
in Schanaveldt v. Noy-Burn Milling & Processing Corp., 347 P.2d 
553, 554 (Utah 1959). Thus, if Johnson-Bowles was indeed stupid 
or negligent for having made a market in U.S.A. Medical stock in 
the first instance, it is a classic non sequitur to conclude that 
Johnson-Bowles (and Johnson) acted "dishonestly" or "unethically" 
several months later in buying stock to honor contractual 
commitments incurred in the ordinary course of such prior 
market-making activity, conduct subsequently undertaken in good 
faith to protect itself and those to whom it owed stock. 
4 486 U.S. 622, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658, [*87-'88 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f93,790 (June 15, 1988); see also p. 6, the Johnsons' December 13, 1991, 
Petition for Rehearing below. 
The Johnsons1 Petition is not, by any means, an attempt 
to reargue the facts of the case. Division brief, pp. 3-4. On 
the contrary, it is only an attempt to get a fair and honest 
application of the law to such facts. 
The Johnsons' Petition for Writ of Certiorari adequately 
addresses all other issues raised by the Division in its brief in 
opposition.5 
Based on the foregoing, more especially the Johnsons1 
March 20, 1992, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, there is 
absolutely no legal or other basis for the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the Johnsons engaged in "dishonest or unethical 
[business] practices," let alone that it was in the "public 
interest" to put them out of business. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DATED this 30th day of Aptfllf, fi.992, 
n Michael Coor 
torney for the Johnsons 
5
 The Division argues that the Johnsons have failed to meet any criterion for 
certiorari set forth in Rule 46, Utah R. App. Pro. Division brief at pp. 6-7. While the 
Johnsons contend in their Petition that they meet Rule 46(a), (c) and (d), they also meet Rule 
46(b). This is because the Court of Appeals' amended decision is in direct conflict with 
Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm., 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). 
While Morton talks generally of agencies being "in a better position than the courts to give 
effect to the regulatory objective," Morton does not give the Court of Appeals a blanket and 
blind license to "rubberstamp" final agency actions — something that unquestionably 
occurred in this case. 
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(h) If the Commission after appropriate notice and hearing find f^cWfFTIie 
sponsor of any plan absent reasonable justification or excuse, has fc^lSrrocomply, 
or to enforce compliance by participants or subscribers withU|beHerms conditions, 
and undertakings of its effective trading system plg^jflrcl if it appears to the 
Commission that such failure is inconsistent wtf^ jifife public interest, the protec 
tion of investors, and the maintenance of fe^r^md orderly markets or the removal 
of impediments to and perfection oijjptf mechanisms of a national market system 
for securities and a national systpirfor the clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions the Commissjfljgmall rescind the effectiveness of the trading system 
plan 
(I) EffeoflfFcIaLes The effective date of this section shall be [six months after 
date fofcjifloption of rule] 
[H 25,116] Initiation or Resumption of Quotations Without 
Specified Information 
m->- Rule 15c2-l 1 is amended and proposed to be amended See below 
Reg §240 15c2-U. (a) It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive 
practice within the meaning of Section 15(c)(2) of the Act, for a broker or dealer to 
publish any quotation for a security or, directly or indirectly, to submit any such 
quotation for publication, in any quotation medium (as defined in this rule) unless 
(1) The issuer has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 
other than a registration statement on Form F-6, which became effective less than 90 
calendar days prior to the day on which such broker or dealer publishes or submits the 
quotation to the quotation medium, Provided That such registration statement has not 
thereafter been the subject of a stop order which is still in effect when the quotation is 
published or submitted, and such broker or dealer has in his records a copy of the 
prospectus specified by Section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, [Amended in 
Release No 34-21470 (f 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ] 
(2) the issuer has filed a notification under Regulation A under the Securities Act 
of 1933 which became effective less than 40 calendar days prior to the day on which 
such broker or dealer publishes or submits the quotation to the quotation medium, 
provided that the offering circular provided for under Regulation A has not thereafter 
become the subject of a suspension order which is still in effect when the quotation is 
published or submitted, and such broker or dealer has in his records a copy of such 
offering circular, or 
(3) (I) the issuer is required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of 
the Act, or is the issuer of a security covered by Section 12(g)(2)(B) or (G) of 
the Act, and 
(n) the broker or dealer has a reasonable basis for believing that the issuer is 
current in filing the reports required to be filed at regular intervals pursuant 
to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Act, or, in the case of insurance companies 
exempted from Section 12(g) of the Act by subparagraph 12(g)(2)(G) thereof, 
the annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) of the Act, and 
(in) the broker or dealer has in his records the issuer's most recent annual 
report filed pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Act or the annual 
statement in the case of an insurance company not subject to Section 12(g) of 
the Act together with any other reports required to be filed at regular 
intervals under such provisions of the Act which have been filed by the issuer 
after such annual report or annual statement, or 
Federal Securities Law Reports Reg. § 240.15c2-ll 1f 25,116 
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(4)(i) The issuer is exempt from Section 12(g) of the Act by reason of compliance 
with the provisions of §240 12g3-2(b), and [Added in Release No 34-21470 (If 83,705), 
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ] 
(n) The broker or dealer wishing to submit for publication a quotation for such 
security has in his records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person 
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security with such broker or 
dealer, the information furnished to the Commission pursuant to §240 12g3-2(b) since 
the beginning of the issuer's last fiscal year, which the broker or dealer has no 
reasonable basis for believing is not true and correct and which was obtained by him 
from sources that he has a reasonable basis for believing are reliable, or [Added in 
Release No 34-21470 flf 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ] 
(5) Such broker or dealer has in his records, and shall make reasonably available 
upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the 
security with such broker or dealer, the following information (which shall be reasona-
bly current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted), which he has no 
reasonable basis for believing is not true and correct or reasonably current, and which 
was obtained by him from sources which he has a reasonable basis for believing are 
reliable (1) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any), (2) the address of 
its principal executive offices, (3) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation, (4) 
the exact title and class of the security, (5) the par or stated value of the security, (6) 
the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the end of the 
issuer's most recent fiscal year, (7) the name and address of the transfer agent, (8) the 
nature of the issuer's business, (9) the nature of products or services offered, (10) the 
nature and extent of the issuer's facilities, (11) the name of the chief executive officer 
and members of the board of directors, (12) the issuer's most recent balance sheet and 
profit and loss and retained earnings statements, (13) similar financial information for 
such part of the two preceding fiscal years as the issuer or its predecessor has been in 
existence, (14) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated, 
directly or indirectly with the issuer, (15) whether the quotation is being published or 
submitted on behalf of any other broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or 
dealer, and, (16) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or 
indirectly on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of the outstanding units or 
shares of any equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such person, and the 
basis for any exemption under the federal securities laws for any sales of such securities 
on behalf of such person If such information is made available to others upon request 
pursuant to this subparagraph, such delivery, unless otherwise represented, shall not 
constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that such information is true and 
correct, but shall constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that the 
information is reasonably current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted, 
that he has no reasonable basis for believing the information is not true and correct, 
and that the information was obtained from sources which he has a reasonable basis for 
believing are reliable This paragraph (a)(5) shall not apply to any security of an issuer 
included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section unless a report or statement of such issuer 
described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section is not reasonably available to the broker or 
dealer A report or statement of an issuer described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
shall be "reasonably available" when such report or statement is filed with the 
Commission [Amended in Release No 34-21470 (fl 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 
49 FR 45117] 
(b) With respect to any security the quotation of which is within the provisions of 
this rule, the broker or dealer submitting or publishing such quotation shall maintain in 
his records information regarding all circumstances involved in the submission of 
publication of such quotation, including the identitv of the person or persons for whom 
U 25,116 Reg- § 240.15c2-ll ©1991, Commerce Cleanng House, Inc 
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the quotation is being submitted or published and any information regarding the 
transaction provided to the broker or dealer by such person or persons. 
(c) The broker or dealer shall maintain in writing as part of his records the 
information described in paragraphs (a) and (b), and any other information (including 
adverse information) regarding the issuer which comes to his knowledge or possession 
before the publication or submission of the quotation, and preserve such records for the 
periods specified in Rule 17a-4 
(d) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(5), the broker or dealer 
submitting the quotation shall furnish to the inter-dealer-quotation-system (as defined 
below), in such form as such system shall prescribe, at least 2 days before the quotation 
is published or submitted, the information regarding the security and the issuer which 
such broker or dealer is required to maintain pursuant to said paragraph (aX4). 
[Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (If 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 
45117.] 
Wh+ Reproduced below is the text of Rule 15c2~ll, paragraph (a)-(d) as amended, 
effective June 1,1991. 
Preliminary Note: Brokers and dealers may wish to refer to Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 29094 (April 17, 1991), for a discussion of procedures for gathering 
and reviewing the information required by this rule and the requirement that a broker 
or dealer have a reasonable basis for believing that the information is accurate and 
obtained from reliable sources. 
Reg. §240.15c2-ll. (a) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, it shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer 
to publish any quotation for a security or, directly or indirectly, to submit any such 
quotation for publication, in any quotation medium (as defined in this section) unless 
such broker or dealer has in its records the documents and information required by this 
paragraph (for purposes of this section, "paragraph (a) information"), and, based upon 
a review of the paragraph (a) information together with any other documents and 
information required by paragraph (b) of this section, has a reasonable basis under the 
circumstances for believing that the paragraph (a) information is accurate in all 
material respects, and that the sources of the paragraph (a) information are reliable. 
The information required pursuant to this paragraph is: 
(1) A copy of the prospectus specified by section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 
for an issuer that has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 
other than a registration statement on Form F-6, which became effective less than 90 
calendar days prior to the day on which such broker or dealer publishes or submits the 
quotation to the quotation medium, Provided That such registration statement has not 
thereafter been the subject of a stop order which is still in effect when the quotation is 
published or submitted; or 
(2) A copy of the offering circular provided for under Regulation A under the 
Securities Act of 1933 for an issuer that has filed a notification under Regulation A 
which became effective less than 40 calendar days prior to the day on which such 
broker or dealer publishes or submits the quotation to the quotation medium, Provided 
That the offering circular provided for under Regulation A has not thereafter become 
the subject of a suspension order which is still in effect when the quotation is published 
or submitted, or 
(3) A copy of the issuer's most recent annual report filed pursuant to Section 13 or 
15(d) of the Act or a copy of the annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) 
of the Act, in the case of an issuer required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or 
15(d) of the Act or an issuer of a security covered by section 12(gX2XB) or (G) of the 
Act, together with any quarterly and current reports that have been filed under the 
provisions of the Act by the issuer after such annual report or annual statement; 
Provided, however, That until such issuer has filed its first annual report pursuant to 
Federal Securities Law Reports Reg. § 240.15c2-ll 1f 25,116 
18,255-8 Broker-Dealer Regulation 1445 5-1-91 
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Act or annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) 
of the Act, the broker or dealer has in its records a copy of the prospectus specified by 
Section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 included in a registration statement filed by 
the issuer under the Securities Act of 1933, other than a registration statement on 
Form F-6, that became effective within the prior 16 months or a copy of any 
registration statement filed by the issuer under Section 12 of the Act that became 
effective within the prior 16 months, together with any quarterly and current reports 
filed thereafter under section 13 or 15(d) of the Act; and Provided Further That the 
broker or dealer has a reasonable basis under the circumstances for believing that the 
issuer is current in filing annual, quarterly, and current reports filed pursuant to 
section 13 or 15(d) of the Act, or, in the case of an insurance company exempted from 
section 12(g) of the Act by reason of section 12(g)(2)(G) thereof, the annual statement 
referred in section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) of the Act; or 
(4) The information furnished to the Commission pursuant to §240.12g3-2(b) 
since the beginning of the issuer's last fiscal year, in the case of an issuer exempt from 
Section 12(g) of the Act by reason of compliance with the provisions of §240.12g3-2(b), 
which information the broker or dealer shall make reasonably available upon request to 
any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security with such 
broker or dealer; or 
(5) The following information, which shall be reasonably current in relation to the 
day the quotation is submitted and which the broker or dealer shall make reasonably 
available upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction 
in the security with such broker or dealer: 
(i) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any); 
(ii) the address of its principal executive offices; 
(iii) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation; 
(iv) the exact title and class of the security; 
(v) the par or stated value of the security; 
(vi) the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the 
end of the issuer's most recent fiscal year; 
(vii) the name and address of the transfer agent; 
(viii) the nature of the issuer's business; 
(ix) the nature of products or services offered; 
(x) the nature and extent of the issuer's facilities; 
(xi) the name of the chief executive officer and members of the board of directors; 
(xii) the issuer's most recent balance sheet and profit and loss and retained 
earnings statements; 
(xiii) similar financial information for such part of the two preceding fiscal years 
as the issuer or its predecessor has been in existence; 
(xiv) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated, directly or 
indirectly with the issuer; 
(xv) whether the quotation is being published or submitted on behalf of any other 
broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or dealer, and, 
(xvi) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or indirectly 
on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of the outstanding units or shares of any 
equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such person, and the basis for any 
11 25,116 Reg. § 240.15c2-ll ©1991, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
1445 5-1-91 Prohibited Ac t i v i t i es—§ 15(c) 18,255*9 
exemption under the federal securities laws for any sales of such securities on behalf of 
such person. 
If such information is made available to others upon request pursuant to this 
paragraph, such delivery, unless otherwise represented, shall not constitute a 
representation by such broker or dealer that such information is accurate, but shall 
constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that the information is reasonably 
current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted, that the broker or dealer has 
a reasonable basis under the circumstances for believing the information is accurate in 
all material respects, and that the information was obtained from sources which the 
broker or dealer has a reasonable basis for believing are reliable. This paragraph (a)(5) 
shall not apply to any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
unless a report or statement of such issuer described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
is not reasonably available to the broker or dealer. A report or statement of an issuer 
described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section shall be "reasonably available" when such 
report or statement is filed with the Commission. [Amended in Release No.-34-21470 
(1183,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117; and Release No. 34-29094 
(f 84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.] 
(b) With respect to any security the quotation of which is within the provisions of 
this section, the broker or dealer submitting or publishing such quotation shall have in 
its records the following documents and information: 
(1) A record of the circumstances involved in the submission of publication of such 
quotation, including the identity of the person or persons for whom the quotation is 
being submitted or published and any information regarding the transactions provided 
to the broker or dealer by such person or persons; 
(2) A copy of any trading suspension order issued by the Commission pursuant to 
Section 12(k) of the Act respecting any securities of the issuer or its predecessor (if any) 
during the 12 months preceding the date of the publication or submission of the 
quotation, or a copy of the public release issued by the Commission announcing such 
trading suspension order; and 
(3) A copy or a written record of any other material information (including 
adverse information) regarding the issuer which comes to the broker's or dealer's 
knowledge or possession before the publication or submission of the quotation. 
[Amended in Release No. 34-29094 (ff 84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.] 
(c) The broker or dealer shall preserve the documents and information required 
under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section for a period of not less than three years, the 
first two vears in an easily accessible place. [Amended in Release No. 34-29094 
(1f84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.] 
Proposed Amendment 
»»-> Reproduced below is the text of paragraph (cX2) as proposed to be added in 
Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726), April 17, 1991. Existing paragraph (c) would be 
redesignated as (cXO-
(2) The broker or dealer need not have in its records the information described in 
this paragraph (a), or make information available to other persons in accordance with 
paragraph (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this section, to the extent that such information is 
reasonably available to the broker or dealer and such other persons from an entity 
designated by the Commission by rule, regulation, or order as a securities information 
repository. In determining whether to grant, deny, suspend, condition, or withdraw 
such a designation, the Commission will consider whether the repository 
(0 collects information about a substantial segment of issuers of securities subject 
to this rule, 
(n) maintains current and accurate information about such issuers; 
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(iii) has effective acquisition, retrieval, and dissemination systems; 
(iv) places no inappropriate limits on the issuers from or about which it will accept 
information; 
(v) provides access to the documents deposited with it to anyone willing and able 
to pay the applicable fees; 
(vi) charges reasonable fees; and 
(vii) in general, is so organized and has the capacity to be able reasonably to carry 
out the purposes of this section. 
End ol Proposed Amendment 
m+ Paragraph (d) is proposed to be removed in Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726), 
April 17,1991. Existing paragraphs (e)-(h) would be redesigna ted as (djh(g). 
(d)(1) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(5) of this section, 
the broker or dealer submitting the quotation shall furnish to the interdealer quotation 
system (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this section), in such form as such system 
shall prescribe, at least 3 business days before the quotation is published or submitted, 
the information regarding the security and the issuer which such broker or dealer is 
required to maintain pursuant to said paragraph (a)(5) of this section. 
(2) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, (i) a 
broker-dealer shall be in compliance with the requirement to obtain current reports 
filed by the issuer if the broker-dealer obtains all current reports filed with the 
Commission by the issuer as of a date up to five business days in advance of the earlier 
of the date of submission of the quotation to the quotation medium and the date of 
submission of paragraph (a) information pursuant to Schedule H of the By-Laws of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; and (ii) a broker-dealer shall be in 
compliance with the requirements to obtain the annual, quarterly, and current reports 
filed by the issuer, if the broker-dealer has made arrangements to receive all such 
reports when filed by the issuer and it has regularly received reports from the issuer on 
a timely basis, unless the broker-dealer has a reasonable basis under the circumstances 
for behaving that the issuer has failed to file a required report or has filed a report but 
has not sent it to the broker-dealer. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (1(83,705), 
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45-117; and Release No. 34-29094 (f 84,725), 
effective June 1,1991, 56 F.R. 19148.] 
(e) For purposes of this rule: 
(1) "Quotation medium" shall mean any "inter-dealer quotation system" or 
any publication or electronic communications network or other device which is 
ustfd by brokers or dealers to make known to others their interest in transactions in 
any security, including offers to buy or sell at a stated price or otherwise, or 
invitations of offers to buy or selL 
(2) "inter-dealer quotation system" shall mean any system of general circula-
tion to brokers or dealers which regularly disseminates quotations of identified 
brokers or dealers. 
(3) Except as otherwise specified in this rule, "quotation" shall mean any bid 
or offer at a specified price with respect to a security, or any indication of interest 
by a broker or dealer in receiving bids or offers from others for a security, or any 
indication by a broker or dealer that he wishes to advertise his general interest in 
buying or selling a particular security. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 
(fl 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(4) "Issuer," in the case of quotations represented by American Depositary 
Receipts, shall mean the issuer of the deposited shares represented by such 
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American Depositary Receipts. [Added in Release No 34-21470 (If 83,705) 
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(f) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to-
(1) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security admitted to 
trading on a national securities exchange and which is traded on such an exchange on 
the same day as, or on the business day next preceding, the day the quotation is 
published or submitted 
(2) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, solely on behalf of a 
customer (other than a person acting as or for a dealer), of a quotation that represents 
the customer's indication of interest and does not involve the solicitation of the 
customer's interest, Provided, however, That this paragraph (f)(2) shall not apply to a 
quotation consisting of both a bid and an offer, each of which is at a specified price, 
unless the quotation medium specifically identifies the quotation as representing such 
an unsolicited customer interest. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (f 83,705), effec-
tive January 14, 1985, 49 F R. 45117.] 
(3)(i) The publication or submission, in an interdealer quotation system that 
specifically identifies as such unsolicited customer indications of interest of the kind 
described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, of a quotation respecting a security which 
has been the subject of quotations (exclusive of any identified customer interests) in 
such a system on each of at least 12 days within the previous 30 calendar days, with no 
more than 4 business days in succession without a quotation; or [Amended in Release 
No. 34-21470 fl[ 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(ii) The publication or submission, in an interdealer quotation system that does 
not so identify any such unsolicited customer indications of interest, of a quotation 
respecting a security which has been the subject of both bid and ask quotations in an 
interdealer quotation system at specified prices on each of at least 12 days within the 
previous 30 calendar days, with no more than 4 business days in succession without 
such a two-way quotation; [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (jf 83,705), effective 
January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(iii) A dealer acting in the capacity of market maker, as defined in section 3(a)(38) 
of the Act, that has published or submitted a quotation respecting a security in an 
interdealer quotation system and such quotation has qualified for an exception pro-
vided in this paragraph (f)(3), may continue to publish or submit quotations for such 
security in the interdealer quotation system without compliance with this section 
unless and until such dealer ceases to submit or publish a quotation or ceases to act in 
the capacity of market maker respecting such security. [Amended in Release No. 
34-21470 (|[ 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
Proposed Amendment — 
m-+ Reproduced below is the text of paragraphs (e)(2) and (eX3) as proposed to be 
redesignated from (f)(2) and (3) and amended in Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726), April 
17,1991. 
(2) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, solely on behalf of a 
customer (other than a person acting as or for a dealer), of a quotation that represents 
the customer's indication of interest and does not involve the solicitation of the 
customer's interest; Provided, however, That no broker or dealer shall publish or submit 
for publication in an interdealer quotation system a quotation representing such an 
unsolicited customer interest unless the system specifically so identifies the quotation. 
(3) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, in an interdealer 
quotation system, of a quotation respecting a security which has been the subject of 
quotations by that broker or dealer in such a system on each of at least 12 days within 
the previous 30 calendar days and no more than 4 successive business days have 
elapsed during such 30-day period between published quotations of such broker or 
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dealer for the security: Provided, That such broker or dealer has, at least once during 
the 12-month period prior to the publication or submission of the quotation, complied 
with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section concerning the requirement to have 
and review specified records relating to the security. 
End of Proposed Amendment 
(4) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a municipal security. 
[As added by Release No. 34-12468 tf[ 80,544), May 20, 1976, effective July 5, 1976, 41 
F.R. 22826.] 
(5) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security that is 
authorized for quotation in an interdealer quotation system sponsored and governed by 
the rules of a registered securities association, and such authorization is not suspended, 
terminated or prohibited. [Added in Release No. 34-21470 (tf 83,705), effective January 
14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
»»-•• Reproduced below is the text of paragraph (0(5) as amended effective June 1, 
1991. 
(5) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security that is 
authorized for quotation in the NASDAQ system (as defined in § 240.1 lAcl-2(a)(3) of 
this chapter), and such authorization is not suspended, terminated, or prohibited. 
[Added in Release No. 34-21470 (fl 83,705); effective January 14, 1985; amended in 
Release No. 34-29094 fl[ 84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.] 
[Adopted in Release No. 34-12630 (fl 80,646), July 15, 1976, 41 F.R. 30009; 
amended in Release No. 34-13310 (H 80,987), February 28, 1977, 42 F.R. 50646; 
amended in Release No. 34-13544 fl[ 81,174), May 16, 1977, 42 F.R. 27881; amended 
in Release No. 34-13807 (If 81,268), July 28, 1977, 42 F.R. 27881; amended in Release 
No. 34-21470 flf 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
' (g) The requirement in subparagraph (a)(5) that the information with respect to 
the issuer be "reasonably current" will be presumed to be satisfied, unless the broker or 
dealer has information to the contrary, if: [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 
(H 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(1) the balance sheet is as of a date less than 16 months before the publication 
or submission of the quotation, the statements of profit and loss and retained 
earnings are for the 12 months preceding the date of such balance sheet, and if 
such balance sheet is not as of a date less than 6 months before the publication or 
submission of the quotation, it shall be accompanied by additional statements of 
profit and loss and retained earnings for the period from the date of such balance 
sheet to a date less than 6 months before the publication or submission of the 
quotation. 
(2) other information regarding the issuer specified in subparagraph (a)(4) is 
as of a date within 12 months prior to the publication or submission of the 
quotation. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (f 83,705), effective January 14, 
1985, 49 F.R. 45117.] 
(h) This rule shall not prohibit any publication or submission of any quotation if 
the Commission, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts such quotation 
either unconditionally or on specific terms and conditions, as not constituting a 
fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive practice comprehended within the purpose of 
this rule. 
[Adopted in Release No. 34-9310 (see CCH Special Report No. 387, Extra Edition, 
September 1, 1971), effective December 13, 1971, 36 F.R. 18,641; Release No. 
34-12468 (1180,544), May 20, 1976, effective July 5, 1976, 41 F.R. 22826. Temporary 
rule (f)(4)(T) adopted in Release No. 34-12630 (1f 80,646) and extended to February 28, 
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[11 96,195] Jesup, Josephthal & Co., Inc., et al. v. Piguet & Cie., et al. 
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 90 Civ. 6544 (WK). August 21, 
1991. Opinion in full text. 
1. Exchange Act—Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts.—A foreign bank charged with securi-
ties fraud was subject to jurisdiction in the district in which it maintained brokerage bank accounts. 
Although the bank had no offices in the United States, and was not authorized to conduct business 
here, by opening trading accounts it availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. 
See H 26,540. "Exchange Act—Insiders; Recordkeeping; Clearance & Transfer" division, Vol-
ume 4. 
2. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting.—Allegations that a foreign bank 
assisted a trader's price manipulation scheme by representing to a brokerage firm that it would pay 
for the trader's purchase orders when it knew that he did not have the funds to cover the purchases 
were sufficient to state an aiding and abetting claim. Limited discovery would be permitted as to 
whether the representations were known by the bank to be false at the time they were made, and 
whether the bank's knowledge of the trader's fraudulent scheme could be inferred from its own 
trading activities in the stock in question. 
See 1122,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division, 
Volume 3. 
3. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting—In Pari Delicto Defense.—A bro-
kerage firm was not precluded from recovering on an aiding and abetting claim against a bank by its 
own claimed imprudence and negligence which allegedly caused its financial losses. The in pari 
dclicco defense may be invoked only if the plaintiff has been an active, voluntary participant in the 
unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit. Mere stupidity or recklessness will not trigger this 
bar. 
See U 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division, 
Volume 3. 
Opinion of KNAPP, District Judge. 
By this complaint plaintiffs Jesup, Josephthal 
& Co., Inc. and Securities Settlement Corpora-
tion (hereinafter "plaintiff"), registered securi-
ties broker-dealers in the state of New York, 
allege, inter alia, that the defendants violated 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. On Janaury 16, 1991, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX2) defendant Piguet & 
Cie, Banquiers (hereinafter, "Piguet") now 
moves to dismiss that complaint on the ground 
that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
it. In the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
it moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. For the rea-
sons that follow, the motions are denied. 
Rule 12(b)(2) 
Because a determination that we do not have 
jurisdiction over Piguet would leave us without 
power to adjudicate any other matter relating to 
it, we first address this question. 
BACKGROUND 
Piguet is a private bank organized as a part-
nership under the laws of Switzerland with its 
1
 In opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff draws our 
attention to yet another account that Piguet has with a 
New York brokerage house, namely the "Cowen & Co. 
account" which is nowhere mentioned in the complaint. 
Plaintiff asserts that Piguet has engaged in substantial 
principal place of business in Switzerland. Plain-
tiff seeks to recover as against Piguet for its 
alleged involvement in a fraud perpetrated by 
defendant Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik"), 
whom the complaint names as the primary 
wrongdoer. As discussed in greater detail infra, 
Piguet's alleged participation in this fraud 
arises from activities it performed in connection 
with a brokerage bank account it maintains at 
Morgan Guaranty Trust (hereinafter "Morgan 
Guaranty") in New York City. 
In support of its contention that we lack 
personal jurisdiction over it, Piguet informs us 
that it does not maintain offices in the United 
States and is not authorized to conduct business 
here. Its sole contacts with the United States are 
three brokerage bank accounts in New York: the 
above described Morgan Guaranty account, and 
one account each with the Philadelphia Interna-
tional Bank and the American Express Bank 
Limited. Piguet asserts that these accounts exist 
solely to facilitate international banking trans-
actions, including stock purchase transactions, 
and that it maintains these accounts primarily 
as a service to its customers. Def. Mem. p.24.1 
Although it does not dispute plaintiff's allega-
tion that some of the transactions in these 
trading in this account. Piguet contests plaintiff's descrip-
tion of this account as a New York account asserting that 
this account was serviced by Cowen's office in Geneva, 
Switzerland. See Def. Reply Mem. p. 13. Since we find that 
on the facts pleaded in the complaint that we have personal 
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accounts are performed for the bank's own 
investment purposes, it contends that since the 
only alleged connection which these accounts 
have with the instant suit stems from activities 
it performed on behalf of its client, Kutik, "it 
would be unreasonable and unfair to subject [it] 
to the jurisdiction of this Court." Id. We disa-
gree. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well settled that personal jurisdiction 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
extends "to the full reach permitted by the due 
process clause." Perez-Rubio v. Wvckoff 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) 718 F.Supp. 217, 227. Accord-
ingly jurisdiction can be obtained over any 
defendant who has "certain minimum contacts 
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of 
this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 
227-228 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316). The inquiry is 
necessarily fact specific. Where, as here, juris-
diction is to be asserted over a defendant who is 
not present in the forum state but has caused an 
effect in the state by an act done elsewhere, due 
process requires that the court determine that 
the defendant's conduct was such that he 
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court [in the forum state]" before the exercise of 
jurisdiction is proper. See Perez-Rubio, 718 
F.Supp. at 228 (citation omitted). 
Despite Piguet's recitation of the dearth of 
contacts it has with this forum, it is undisputed 
that it purchases and sells stock for its clients on 
a continuing basis through the above described 
correspondent bank accounts. It is also undis-
puted that the cause of action here asserted 
against it arises out of its alleged activities in 
one of these accounts, namely the account at 
Morgan Guaranty. Although Piguet strenuously 
argues that its activities with respect to the 
Morgan account here complained of were per-
formed on behalf of its client, and not itself, we 
find this fact to be of little relevance for by 
offering the services provided by these accounts 
to its clients, Piguet acts to inure to its own 
benefit. See Securities Exchange Commission v. 
Gilbert (1979) 82 F.R.D. 723, 725. By opening 
these accounts Piguet purposely chose to 
"[avail] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson 
v. Denckla (1957) 357 U.S. 235, 253. Thus, it is 
only reasonable to conclude that Piguet must 
"anticipate being haled into court" in New York 
for alleged illegal conduct it performed through 
these accounts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ("When a 
(Footnote Continued) 
jurisdiction over Piguet we need not presently address the 
merits of this dispute. 
corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State' it has clear notice that it is subject 
to suit there"); see Gilbert, 82 F.R.D. at 725, 
726 (noting that personal jurisdiction was 
proper over Swiss bank whose only contact with 
New York was through four accounts main-
tained with three New York broker-dealers, 
since the cause of action sued upon arose out of 
the purchases and sales of stock in New York 
"which were not only the direct and foreseeable, 
but the intended "effects" of the bank's "acts" 
in Switzerland). Accordingly we find that in the 
circumstances before us the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Piguet comports with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice. Cf. Perez-Rubio, 718 F.Supp. at 227 ("On a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) . . . 
all doubts are to be resolved in the plaintiff's 
favor . . . a plaintiff need make out only a prima 
facie case of personal jurisdiction"). 
Rule 12(b)(6) 
In support of its motion to dismiss pursuant 
to 12(b)(6) Piguet makes two contentions. First 
it asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead fraud 
with particularity as required by Rule 9. Sec-
ond, it contends that plaintiff's actions were as 
egregious as its own, and therefore that the 
doctrine of pari delicto should bar plaintiff from 
recovering as against it. We shall address each 
of these contentions in turn. 
BACKGROUND 
The theory of the complaint is that defendant 
Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik") schemed to 
inflate the value of Columbia Laboratories stock 
(hereinafter "Columbia") in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder. See 15 
U.S.C. §78j; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. In particu-
lar, the complaint alleges that Kutik placed buy 
orders for Columbia stock with various broker-
age houses with no intention of actually paying 
for the ordered shares. Plaintiff contends that 
Kutik's motivation for this fraud stems from the 
fact that he had secured substantial loans using 
Columbia shares as collateral, and that, accord-
ing to the terms of these loan agreements, he 
would be obligated to put up additional collat-
eral as security should the value of Columbia 
stock decline to below $9.00 a share. 
The gravamen of the claim against Piguet is 
that Piguet aided and abetted Kutik's scheme to 
manipulate the price of Columbia stock. The 
relevant facts of this claim are as follows. 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 3, 
1990, it was contacted by Kutik to open an 
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account on behalf of Dermar Panama, SA (here-
inafter, the " D e r m a r " account) 2. Kutik 
informed plaintiff that he had authority to open 
this account and to direct trading activities 
therein on Dermar's behalf. In the following 
week, acting under Kutik's instructions, plain-
tiff purchased an aggregate of 80,500 shares of 
Columbia common stock for the Dermar 
account. Although Kutik represented that pay-
ment for said purchases would be prompt, no 
such payments were ever made. Compl. f 96. 
On August 14, at Kutik's request, plaintiff 
opened a second account, entitled the Farnell 
Holdings, Ltd. account (hereinafter the "Far-
nell" account)3. Pursuant to Kutik's instruc-
tions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 88,300 
shares of Columbia common stock for this 
account over the next week. 
After plaintiff made repeated demands for 
payment for the Dermar purchases, Kutik 
informed it that payment could be facilitated if 
it would transfer the stock which it had pur-
chased for the Dermar account to a new account 
entitled the "Dermar Morgan" account and des-
ignate Morgan Guaranty as the receiving agent 
for stock purchased for this new account. Kutik 
explained that his bank, Piguet, had an account 
at Morgan Guaranty, and that it would furnish 
the funds necessary to pay for the stock on a 
delivery versus payment basis. He assured 
plaintiff that at all timts there would be suffi-
cient funds on deposit with Morgan Guaranty to 
pav for all transactions effected for this account. 
See id. at 11 102. 
Pursuant to this information, and at Kutik's 
instruction, plaintiff contacted Piguet and was 
informed that "both Kutik and Dermar were 
clients of Piguet and that arrangements were 
being made to make payment for the 80,500 
shares of Columbia stock which [would be] 
transferred to the Dermar Morgan account."4 
Id. at 1| 107. Accordingly, on August 21, 1990, 
plaintiff opened the Dermar Morgan account. 
Between August 21 and August 27, plaintiff 
attempted to deliver to Morgan Guaranty the 
80,500 shares of Columbia stock now purchased 
on behalf of the Dermar Morgan account. Mor-
gan Guarantv, however, refused such deliverv. 
M a t P l l i ; i l 2 . 
Again pursuant to Kutik's instructions, on 
August 29, plaintiff opened a separate account 
entitled the "Farnell Morgan" account, desig-
- Dermar, a defendant in this action, is a Panama corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Switzerland. 
•' Farnell. also a defendant, is a United Kingdom corpora-
tion with us principal place of business in Gibraltar. 
4
 Paragraph 107 of the complaint states that "[Piguet] 
telephoned [plaintiff) prior to August 21. 1990, and eon-
firmed that both Kutik arvd Dermar were clients of Piguet 
and that arrangements were being made to make payment 
nated Morgan Guaranty the receiving agent for 
this account, and transferred to it the stock 
previously purchased for the Farnell account. 
The complaint alleges that to confirm that pay-
ment arrangements were being made for this 
transferred stock, plaintiff again contacted 
Piguet, and was informed that Piguet would 
make immediate payment for "all of the Colum-
bia shares purchased for the various accounts 
maintained by Kutik . . . upon delivery of such 
securities to Morgan [Guarantv] ." Id. at 
H 126, 127. 
At or about this time plaintiff, acting on 
Kutik's instructions, purchased an additional 
66,000 shares of Columbia stock for the Farnell 
Morgan account and transferred all stock then 
in the Dermar Morgan account to this Farnell 
Morgan account. Accordingly, by September 1 
plaintiff had purchased a total of 234,800 shares 
of Columbia stock for Kutik, all of which were 
held in the Farnell Morgan account. 
On several occasions between August 29 and 
September 7 plaintiff attempted to deliver the 
234,800 shares to Morgan Guaranty. However, 
Morgan Guaranty continued to refuse receipt of 
this stock. Id. at jf 132. 
The complaint alleges that thereafter Piguet 
was advised that the 234,800 shares presently 
held in the Farnell Morgan account would be 
resold due to nonpayment. In response, on Sep-
tember 7 Piguet represented to plaintiff that: 
[it] was in the process of making arrange-
ments for the payment for all of the full 
purchase price for all 234,000 [234,000] 
[shares] of Columbia stock held in the Farnell 
Morgan brokerage account, and that the pre-
vious delays preventing Morgan [Guaranty] 
from accepting delivery of said securities and 
tendering payment for same was due to 
problems encountered in transmitting the 
appropriate instructions to Morgan [Guar-
anty] for the conversion of Swiss Francs into 
U.S. Dollars for payment to [plaintiff] for the 
Columbia shares. 
M a t 1J133. 
On September 10, Piguet did in fact forward 
to plaintiff $922,075.58 to pay for 100,000 of 
the 234,800 Columbia shares. Plaintiff alleges 
that in light of the September 7 conversation 
with Piguet it justifiably relied upon the fact 
that this was a partial payment and accordingly 
for the 80.500 shares of Columbia slock, which had been 
transferred to the Dermar Morgan Account, in cash, or by 
delivery of other negotiable securities, to Morgan . . ." Since 
the complaint informs that the Dermar Morgan account 
was not opened until plaintiff had received this information 
we presume the language cited above was intended to be set 
forth in conditional terms. 
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did not liquidate the remaining 134,800 shares. 
Id. at H 191. Thereafter, on September 19, 20, 
and 21, plaintiff's registered representative Jef-
frey Leach introduced Kutik to other broker-
dealers, with whom Kutik proceeded to place 
purchase orders for an additional 56,000 snares 
of Columbia stock. Piguet made no additional 
payments to plaintiff, and in the period of Sep-
tember 20 to December 6 plaintiff sold the 
remaining stock for $684,743. Plaintiff asserts 
that it suffered a loss of $509,958 on this trans-
action.5 
In support of its claim that Piguet aided and 
abetted Kutik's alleged illegal conduct, the com-
plaint specifically pleads "upon information and 
belief" that Piguet knew of the existence and 
purpose of Kutik's scheme to violate the securi-
ties laws, and that it rendered substantial assis-
tance to this scheme. See id. at H K 188, 190. The 
complaint asserts that Piguet's knowledge of the 
underlying securities fraud perpetrated by 
Kutik can be inferred from the fact that Piguet, 
as Kutik's bank, "[knew] of Kutik's financial 
resources and concomitant inability to make 
payment" for the amount of shares he ordered. 
See id. at fl 189. The complaint does not, how-
ever, specifically state that at the time Piguet 
represented to plaintiff that it would pay for all 
shares, see id. at f 133, it knew that it's client 
would not be forwarding to it funds necessary to 
pay for said shares; nor does it allege that when 
Piguet asserted that it had had difficulty trans-
ferring Swiss francs into U.S. currency, see id., it 
knew this statement to be false. 
In its brief in opposition plaintiff offers an 
additional fact from which Piguet's knowledge 
of the alleged securities fraud might be inferred, 
namely that it itself owned a substantial num-
ber of shares of Columbia stock in August 1990, 
and that it engaged in substantial trading activ-
ity in this stock during the period of Kutik's 
alleged fraudulent scheme. See PI. Mem. at 20 
n.2; supra at 2, n.l. Plaintiff concedes, however, 




To state a claim for aider and abettor liability 
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 a plaintiff must allege 
sufficient facts to demonstrate: (1) the existence 
of a securities law violation by the primary 
party; (2) knowledge of the violation by the 
5
 $509 958 represents the difference between the price 
plaintiff originally paid for the shares namely 2,116,777 and 
the price it received from this delayed sale. 
fl
 For purposes of this motion, Piguet assumes that the 
allegations in ihe Amended Complain* are sufficient to 
allege securities laws violations by Kutik. See Def. Mem. at 
14 n.7. 
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aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance 
by the aider and abettor in achievement of the 
primary violation. Armstrong v. McAIpin (2d 
Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 79, 91. In support of this 
motion to dismiss, Piguet contends that the alle-
gations of the complaint are insufficient to prop-
erly plead factors (2) and (3).6 
With respect to factor (3) Piguet contends 
that as a matter of law its three conversations 
with plaintiff do not constitute "substantial 
assistance". Def. Mem at 20. We disagree. The 
success of Kutik's alleged scheme artificially to 
inflate the price of Columbia stock was depen-
dent on his ability to induce plaintiff to 
purchase shares on his behalf, over a period of 
time. We can not say as a matter of law that no 
reasonable juror could conclude that Piguet's 
affirmative statement to plaintiff that it would 
pay for all shares ordered by Kutik did not 
substantially assist Kutik in this task. Accord-
ingly, we turn to the question of whether or not 
plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish 
that Piguet knew that Kutik was engaged in a 
scheme to violate the securities laws. 
Citing Rule 97, Piguet contends that even if 
we were to assume that it knew that its client 
Kutik did not have the funds at hand to pay for 
the stock he was instructing plaintiff to 
purchase, it by no means follows that it would 
have known—or even should necessarily have 
suspected—that Kutik was entering orders 
which he did not hope to be able to cover. 
Rather, it contends that it is only logical to infer 
that it assumed Kutik would in due course pro-
vide the necessary funds for his purchases. In 
support of this argument, Piguet draws our 
attention to the absence of any allegation by 
plaintiff that any statements it made to plain-
tiff were "knowinglv false" when made. See 
5/30/91 Tr. at 24. 
At first glance we found these arguments per-
suasive. However, at oral argument plaintiff 
informed us that it did not affirmatively plead 
that Piguet made false statements precisely 
because the information necessary to plead such 
an allegation is exclusively within Piguet's pos-
session. In particular, plaintiff argued that 
whether or not Piguet had in fact had difficulty 
transferring Swiss francs to U.S. dollars, or had 
made any efforts whatsoever prior to September 
10 to pay for any of the stock ordered by Kutik, 
were facts known only to Piguet and could be 
substantiated only through discovery. See id. at 
23-28. 
Rule 9 provides: 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particu-
larity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other conditions of a 
mind of a person may be averred generally. 
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Although Rule 9 requires that allegations of 
fraud be pleaded with particularity, it specifi-
cally provides that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, 
or other conditions of a mind of a person may be 
averred generallv". In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex 
Hospital Trustees (1975) 425 U.S. 738, 746, the 
Supreme Court observed that: 
'[A] complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) . . . And in . . . 
cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands 
of the alleged conspirators,' Poller v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), 
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample 
opportunity for discovery should be granted 
very sparingly. 
Having reviewed all of the allegations of the 
complaint, as well as the briefs submitted in 
relation to the instant motions, we can not say 
that plaintiff can not prove any set of facts in 
support of its claim that Piguet knew of Kutik's 
scheme to violate the securities laws and, 
accordingly, that it aided and abetted him in 
this task. 'Cf. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane (2d Cir. 
1990) 897 F.2d 75, 80-81 (" [p]lausible allega-
tions that defendants made specific promises to 
induce a securities transaction while secretly 
intending not to carry them out or knowing they 
could not be carried out, and that they were not 
carried out, are sufficient . . . to state a claim for 
relief under Section 10(b)' " (citations omitted)). 
Accordingly, pursuant to the teaching of Hospi-
tal Bldg. Co., we presently deny Piguet's motion 
to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with partic-
ularity, and grant plaintiff limited discovery on 
the following two issues: (1) whether or not 
statements which Piguet made to plaintiff dur-
ing any of the three above discussed conversa-
tions were known by Piguet to be false at the 
time they were made, and (2) whether—or to 
what extent—Piguet's knowledge of Kutik's 
fraudulent scheme can be inferred from its own 
trading activities in the shares of Columbia 
stock it owned. Piguet may, of course, renew this 
motion to dismiss at the close of discovery on 
these issues. Plaintiff, if so advised, may in the 
interim file a second amended complaint. 
In pari delicto 
As an alternative ground for dismissing the 
complaint, Piguet asserts that even if the plain-
tiff could allege a valid aiding and abetting 
claim, the doctrine of in pari delicto should 
preclude it from recovering on this claim 
because it was plaintiff's own imprudence and 
negligence which caused it to suffer the finan-
cial loss here asserted. See 5/30/91 Tr. at 28. In 
support of this claim, Piguet cites the facts that 
plaintiff, a sophisticated broker-dealer, pro-
ceeded to permit Kutik to order an aggregate of 
234,800 shares of Columbia stock over a period 
of less than six weeks without ever having paid 
one cent for said purchases, and it even "aided" 
Kutik in his purchase of an additional 56,000 
Columbia shares by introducing him to other 
broker-dealers even though it, itself, had never 
been paid for any of the stock Kutik ordered 
purchased. 
The common law defense of in pari delicto 
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering only if he 
"is as guiltv of wrongdoing as the party he 
accuses." Ross v. Bolton, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 639 
F.Supp. 323, 328 citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust, 
(2d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 68, 76 cert, denied, 
(1981) 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 938, 67 
L.Ed.2d 109. Mere stupidity, or even reckless-
ness, will not suffice to trigger this bar. As the 
Court in Pinter v. Dahl (1988) 486 U.S. 622, 
636 stated: 
The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary 
participant in the unlawful activity that is 
the subject of the suit. 'Plaintiffs who are 
truly in pari delicto aire those who have them-
selves violated the law in cooperation with the 
defendant'. Unless the degrees of fault are 
essentially indistinguishable or the plaintiff's 
responsibility is clearly greater, the in pari 
delicto defense should not be allowed, and the 
plaintiff should be compensated, (citations 
omitted). 
On the facts presently before us, we can not 
conclude that this affirmative defense will inevi-
tably bar plaintiff from recovering against 
Piguet. Piguet does not claim that plaintiff 
knew of Kutik's fraudulent scheme nor does it 
assert that plaintiff's actions to accommodate 
Kutik's requests to purchase stock were in any 
way unlawful. Accordingly, the motion to dis-
miss on this ground is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Piguet's motions to dismiss are denied. It is 
granted leave to renew that portion of its Rule 
12(b)(6) motion specified above after discovery 
on the issues outlined is completed or after a 
reasonable period of time has passed. Plaintiff is 
granted leave to file a second amended com-
plaint, if it be so advised. 
SO ORDERED. 
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